Abstract

I place Kant's moral theology in the context of an intellectual dispute, known as the "pantheism controversy," which erupted in German philosophy in the 1780's. This dispute arose when F. H. Jacobi revealed to Moses Mendelssohn that G. E. Lessing had confessed to being a Spinozist shortly before his death in 1781. Since Spinoza was considered an atheist at the time, Jacobi used Lessing's confession as a means to attack the German Enlightenment, the acknowledged leader of which was Lessing. ;Kant was drawn into the controversy against his will and was forced to defend himself against the charge that he, like Jacobi, advocated an irrational leap of faith to avoid the atheism which Jacobi maintained inevitably arose in philosophy. Kant's defense is to be found in his moral theology, in which he argues that we must postulate the possibility of God's existence if we are to act morally. This postulate, he claims, is made rationally, and thus not by means of an irrational leap of faith. ;Kant's rejection of an irrational leap of faith led Jacobi to criticize Kant's thought in some detail. He rejected Kant's moral theology, and then offered his own philosophy of faith as his response to the pantheism controversy. There are various versions of this philosophy of faith, and I argue that the most plausible one is an extension of Thomas Reid's account of sense perception to include the perception of God. Such an account would provide a basis for belief in God, and would avoid the irrationality of Jacobi's earlier leap of faith. ;Finally, I consider Jacobi's influence on post-Kantian idealism. I argue that his critique of Kant was instrumental in the development of the thought of Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel. I interpret their writings as arising in part from their reading of Jacobi, especially from his critique of the thing in itself. Thus Jacobi, I argue, is important in understanding the transition from Kantian to post-Kantian thought