Contextual pluralism and the libertarian paradox

Archiv Fuer Rechts Und Sozialphilosphie 79 (2):188-197 (1993)
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Abstract

I argue that we can generate intransitive preference orderings for a single person on the model of Sen's Libertarian Paradox

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reprint Bovens, Luc (1993) "Contextual pluralism and the libertarian paradox". Archiv für Rechts- und Sozialphilosophie 79():188-197

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Luc Bovens
University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill

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References found in this work

Intransitivity of preferences.Amos Tversky - 1969 - Psychological Review 76 (1):31-48.
The Fragmentation of Value.Thomas Nagel - 1979 - In Mortal questions. New York: Cambridge University Press.

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