La volonté selon Duns Scot. Indétermination, illimitation et infinité

Quaestio 22:451-471 (2023)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

Medieval philosophers admit a physical indeterminacy of natural powers, because they can be determined by something else. However, rational powers have a metaphysical form of indeterminacy, which allows the will to be determined by reason (Thomas Aquinas), or to determine itself (Duns Scotus). Yet, what distinguishes the two main forms of self-determination in Duns Scotus - the unlimited will and the infinite God? In finite beings, the will is unlimited because it always depends on something else, on an object that is a partial cause of its determination, whereas God depends only on Himself for self-determination. Hence, the concepts of indeterminacy, unlimitedness and infinity are strictly distinct in Duns Scotus.

Other Versions

No versions found

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 101,854

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Thomas, Scotus, and Ockham on the Object of Hope.Thomas M. Osborne - 2020 - Recherches de Theologie Et Philosophie Medievales 87:1-26.
Duns Scotus.[author unknown] - 2007 - In John E. Hare (ed.), God and Morality. Oxford: Blackwell. pp. 75-121.
Duns Scotus on natural and supernatural knowledge of God.William E. Mann - 2002 - In Thomas Williams (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to Duns Scotus. New York: Cambridge University Press. pp. 238--262.
7 Duns Scotus on Natural and Supernatural Knowledge of God.E. William - 2002 - In Thomas Williams (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to Duns Scotus. New York: Cambridge University Press. pp. 238.
Motif Inkarnasi dalam Soteriologi Yohanes Duns Scotus.Bernard Rahadian - 2023 - Diskursus - Jurnal Filsafat dan Teologi STF Driyarkara 19 (1):93-123.
Duns Scotus on the Possibility of an Infinite Being.A. P. Martinich - 1982 - Philosophical Topics 13 (9999):23-29.

Analytics

Added to PP
2023-02-16

Downloads
13 (#1,334,820)

6 months
2 (#1,696,787)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Citations of this work

No citations found.

Add more citations

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references