Buchanan, Hayek, and the Limits of Constitutional Ambitions

In Richard E. Wagner (ed.), James M. Buchanan: A Theorist of Political Economy and Social Philosophy. Palgrave Macmillan. pp. 671-692 (2018)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

James Buchanan shared with F.A. Hayek a deep appreciation of the market as a creative discovery process. Like Hayek, Buchanan understood that the results of market processes are ever-changing, highly complex, and cannot possibly be consciously planned. Yet while Buchanan also shared Hayek’s commitment to classical liberalism—both normatively and as supplying a framework for research—Buchanan rejected Hayek’s thoroughgoing ‘evolutionary’ perspective. Unlike Hayek, Buchanan believed that human beings could and should—in an appropriately structured setting for social contracting—consciously design and choose the foundational rules that undergird society’s daily operations. When subjected to critical evaluation, however, Buchanan’s case for consciously designed and implemented constitutional rules for society does not stand up.

Other Versions

No versions found

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 101,505

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Analytics

Added to PP
2023-03-12

Downloads
7 (#1,639,166)

6 months
3 (#1,473,720)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Citations of this work

No citations found.

Add more citations

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references