Being Reasonable

Studies in Logic, Grammar and Rhetoric 42 (1):17-36 (2015)
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Abstract

Where do the rules of critical discussion get their normative force? What kinds of norms are involved? Unreasonable behaviour in the critical discussion - e.g., continuing to assert the contradictory of a proven standpoint, performing some action pragmatically inconsistent with a proven standpoint, or the same with regard to the starting-points agreed to in the opening stage - is liable to moral sanction. Thus, a moral/ethical norm is involved and the rules must have a moral force. Pragma-dialectics as it stands does not seem to account for this moral force. I will attempt to fill this gap in pragma-dialectical theory.

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David Botting
De La Salle University (PhD)

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Groups with minds of their own.Philip Pettit - 2011 - In Alvin I. Goldman & Dennis Whitcomb (eds.), Social Epistemology: Essential Readings. New York: Oxford University Press.
Group agency and supervenience.Philip Pettit - 2005 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 44 (S1):85-105.
Begging the question.Walter Sinnott-Armstrong - 1999 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 77 (2):174 – 191.

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