On Knowing that One Knows: The Logic of Skepticism and Theory

New York: Peter Lang Incorporated, International Academic Publishers (1993)
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Abstract

The intent of this work is to discover suitable terms for harmonizing the dispositions of both theorist and skeptic and for providing balance between them. Towards reaching balance, the work, in dialectic ways, advances a reconsideration of concepts basic to any epistemology: doubting and affirming, truth and existence, knowing and perceiving, and necessity and contingency. A new account of hypothetical and relative modalities furnishes the mechanism of balance. The work also provides a critical examination of recent defense and criticism of skepticism.

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