Abstract

The primary purpose of this dissertation is to examine and critically evaluate the various justifications used to support selective abortion based on prenatal diagnosis. The dissertation begins with a discussion of the different types of genetic disorders and the methods used in prenatal diagnosis and selective abortion. With the exception of MSAFP testing for neural tube defects and some experimental techniques, prenatal diagnosis is generally carried out early in the second trimester. Consequently, the majority of selective abortions are performed as late as eighteen to twenty weeks gestation. ;Five different arguments supporting selective abortion are examined. The eugenics argument, which claims that selective abortion is a means of significantly reducing genetic "disease," is inadequate since the present programs of voluntary prenatal diagnosis and abortion actually lead to an increase in the deleterious genes in the gene pool because of the increased number of carriers being born. The fetal wastage argument, which regards selective abortion as a means of assisting nature in weeding out defective fetuses, the majority of whom spontaneously abort, runs counter to the traditional goal of medicine which is to interfere with the "intentions" of nature when they cause human suffering. ;The third argument points to the disproportionate burdens which people with serious genetic disorders place on public resources. However, much of their social burdensomeness stems not from the disorder but from discrimination and the lack of opportunity to participate in an achievement-oriented society. The family burden argument, likewise, fails to recognize the extent to which these burdens are caused by lack of social supports. It assumes that parents can abdicate responsibility toward their fetus in the face of social responsibility. ;The "quality of life" argument is also weak. Fetuses with genetic disorders are not generally suffering because of their disorder and possible future suffering is not sufficient moral reason for ending someone's life. All of the above arguments also fail to take into account the potential harms of the prenatal diagnostic and selective abortion procedures. It is concluded, therefore, that, in the great majority of cases, selective abortion cannot be morally justified