Paradoxes of Conviction: Are nurtured beliefs irrational?

Political Philosophy 18:14-37 (2015)
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Abstract

Many religious, ideological and other beliefs are induced by upbringing. In ‘Paradoxes of Conviction’ G.A. Cohen asks why we persist in a belief, when we know we have this belief rather than a rival one, because we were brought up to believe it. Cohen adduces a syllogistic argument (named ‘the Argument’) that seems to demonstrate the irrationality of holding on to such a nurtured belief. If the Argument is right, it has far-reaching consequences because many nurtured religious and other beliefs should then be abandoned as being irrational. This essay shows that the Argument is fallacious.

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Martijn Boot
University of Groningen

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