Troubles with functionalism

Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science 9:261-325 (1978)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

The functionalist view of the nature of the mind is now widely accepted. Like behaviorism and physicalism, functionalism seeks to answer the question "What are mental states?" I shall be concerned with identity thesis formulations of functionalism. They say, for example, that pain is a functional state, just as identity thesis formulations of physicalism say that pain is a physical state

Links

PhilArchive

    This entry is not archived by us. If you are the author and have permission from the publisher, we recommend that you archive it. Many publishers automatically grant permission to authors to archive pre-prints. By uploading a copy of your work, you will enable us to better index it, making it easier to find.

    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 106,716

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Ned Block’s homunculi-headed robot and functionalism.Jack Blackman - 2024 - Undergraduate Philosophy Journal of Australasia 5:1-16.
What is Functionalism?Ned Block - 1980 - In Readings in Philosophy of Psychology: 1. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
What is functionalism.Ned Block - 1980 - In Readings in Philosophy of Psychology: 1. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Robot Pain.Simon van Rysewyk - 2014 - International Journal of Synthetic Emotions 4 (2):22-33.
From Realizer Functionalism to Nonreductive Physicalism.JeeLoo Liu - 2008 - Proceedings of the Xxii World Congress of Philosophy 42:149-160.
Mad, Martian, but not mad Martian pain.Peter Alward - 2004 - Sorites 15 (December):73-75.

Analytics

Added to PP
2009-01-28

Downloads
4,125 (#2,172)

6 months
184 (#23,401)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Ned Block
New York University

Citations of this work

Minds, brains, and programs.John Searle - 1980 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3 (3):417-57.
The representational character of experience.David Chalmers - 2004 - In Brian Leiter, The future for philosophy. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 153--181.
Consciousness and Mind.Carolyn Dicey Jennings - forthcoming - In Marcus Rossberg, The Cambridge Handbook of Analytic Philosophy. Cambridge University Press.
Consciousness Makes Things Matter.Andrew Y. Lee - forthcoming - Philosophers' Imprint.

View all 490 citations / Add more citations

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references