Abstract

Arthur Schopenhauer, a nineteenth-century German philosopher, advocated a unique theory of immortality (athanasia). The present study attempts to indicate that, in spite of the ingeniousness and consolatory appeal of his theory, it is ultimately – according to an orthodox interpretation which wholly identifies the Will with the so-called “thing- in-itself” – untenable and erroneous. In arriving at the aforementioned conclusion, the study attempts to argue that the two pillars upon which Schopenhauer’s theory of athanasia is based are flawed, viz., that the world cannot be entirely mind-dependent and that the Will cannot be considered an explication of the elusive Kantian “thing-in- itself”. The study explores, among other topics, Schopenhauer’s arguments for radical idealism, the compatibility of Schopenhauer’s evolutionary views with that of his radical idealism, the status of the mind within his philosophy, the notion of the Will as a concept and as a product of intellectual intuition, as well as the Will being susceptible to the influences of time, space and causality. The study has been divided into two primary sections: in the first part, a detailed overview of Schopenhauer’s philosophy is presented; this is necessary in so far as Schopenhauer is a systematic thinker, hence, in order for one to fully comprehend his theory of athanasia, it is necessary for one to first acquaint oneself with his two most significant and fundamental notions, viz., his radical idealism and his claim that the Will is the “thing-in-itself”. Once these matters have been presented and discussed, the study turns in earnest to a consideration of Schopenhauer’s theory of immortality. In the second part of the study, the two fundamental pillars of Schopenhauer’s philosophy are subjected to a thorough critique in order to ultimately illustrate the untenability of his theory of athanasia. As part of this enterprise, the study includes an appendix which attempts to illustrate that the Will as “thing-in-itself” is not insusceptible to the law of causation, thereby undermining one of Schopenhauer’s claims for its indestructibility.