The Anna Karenina Theory of the Unconscious

Neuropsychoanalysis 13 (1):34-37 (2011)
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Abstract

The Anna Karenina Theory says: all conscious states are alike; each unconscious state is unconscious in its own way. This note argues that many components have to function properly to produce consciousness, but failure in any one of many different ones can yield an unconscious state in different ways. In that sense the Anna Karenina theory is true. But in another respect it is false: kinds of unconsciousness depend on kinds of consciousness

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Ned Block
New York University

Citations of this work

The Anna Karenina Principle and Skepticism about Unconscious Perception.Ned Block - 2015 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 93 (2):452-459.
Selectionism and Diaphaneity.Paweł Jakub Zięba - 2022 - Axiomathes 32 (Suppl 2):S361–S391.
Temporal Mental Qualities and Selective Attention.Michał Klincewicz - 2016 - Avant: Trends in Interdisciplinary Studies 7 (2):11-24.

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References found in this work

Are Dreams Experiences?Daniel C. Dennett - 1976 - Philosophical Review 85 (2):151.
Levels of processing during non-conscious perception: A critical review of visual masking.Sid Kouider & Stanislas Dehaene - 2007 - Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society of London, B 362 (1481):857-875.
Concepts of Consciousness.Ned Block - 2002 - In David John Chalmers (ed.), Philosophy of Mind: Classical and Contemporary Readings. New York: Oxford University Press USA. pp. 206-218.
Dreaming.Norman MALCOLM - 1959 - Les Etudes Philosophiques 14 (4):548-549.

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