Abstract

Although the prevailing view that makes law simply an instrument of social control supports popular cynicism, it is, as an account of the relationship between law and morality, inadequate. The assurance of legal positivists regarding the logical distinctness of morals and legislation rests on the simplistic belief that moral sanctions are internal and not in conflict with free action while those of the law are external and coercive. With the development of pragmatism and its technology, behaviorism, both the independence and autonomy of the moral subject become suspect. The upshot is that morality too is seen as a form of social control, albeit less explicit than law and the legal positivist's distinction is effectively denied. Now although this modern reintegration of moral and legal concepts provides a basis for addressing hitherto knotty issues such as the grounds of legal obligation it is unsatisfactory because it reduces both law and morality to prudentially justified conventions. One may, however unhappily, accede to this view of law; but as an account of the moral life it is simply incorrect. What is needed is an analysis that retains the integrity of the moral point of view and at the same time answers the objections to both legal positivism and classical natural law theory. The present volume undertakes this daunting task.