Relativism and the abolition of the other

International Journal of Philosophical Studies 12 (3):245 – 258 (2004)
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Abstract

In this paper I consider the 'disappearing we' account of Wittgenstein's attitude to other ways of thought or other 'conceptual schemes'. I argue that there is no evidence that Wittgenstein expected the 'we' to disappear, in the manner of Davidson, and that his affinities with relativistic trains of thought in fact go much deeper.

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Simon Blackburn
Cambridge University

References found in this work

The Disappearing 'We'.Jonathan Lear & Barry Stroud - 1984 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 58 (1):219 - 258.

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