Prospects for a Naturalist Libertarianism: O’Connor’s Persons and Causes

Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 66 (1):228-243 (2003)
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Abstract

There is an alternative reconciliatory naturalist position that rejects each key feature of this “libertarian agent-causationist” view. Taking the features in reverse order, this alternative.

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John Bishop
University of Auckland

Citations of this work

Freedom With a Human Face.Timothy O'Connor - 2005 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 29 (1):207-227.
The Incompatibility of Free Will and Naturalism.Jason Turner - 2009 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 87 (4):565-587.

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