Intentional and Skillful Neurons

Sport, Ethics and Philosophy 11 (3):339-356 (2017)
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Abstract

In the mid-1990s, there was a major neuroscientific discovery which might drastically alter sport science in general and philosophy of sport in particular. The discovery of mirror neurons by Giacomo Rizzolatti and colleagues in Parma, Italy, is a substantial contribution to understanding brains, movements, and humans. Famous neuroscientist V. S. Ramachandran believes the discovery of mirror neurons ‘will do for psychology what DNA did for biology’. Somehow mirror neurons have not received the deserved attention in the philosophy of sport, but perhaps now is the time to reflect on some implications and consequences. The discovery of mirror neurons may increase our insights about our ability to learn, understand, intend, and produce skillful motor actions. In this article I will first examine what mirror neurons are and how they function in monkeys and humans. Second, I will review some objections to the so-called mirror neuron theory of action understanding, and try to reconcile some of these objections. Third, I will inquire into some implications for philosophy, which I believe are also fundamental to several topics in the philosophy of sport. I will then try to relate some of the most interesting aspects of mirror neurons to recent debates in the philosophy of sport. Finally, I will speculate on what further neuroscientific research might teach us about the nature of being a moving subject.

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Citations of this work

Skill acquisition without representation.Albert Piacente - 2018 - Journal of the Philosophy of Sport 45 (3):241-258.

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Actions, Reasons, and Causes.Donald Davidson - 1963 - Journal of Philosophy 60 (23):685.
What is it like to be a bat?Thomas Nagel - 1979 - In Mortal questions. New York: Cambridge University Press. pp. 435 - 450.
Participatory sense-making: An enactive approach to social cognition.Hanne De Jaegher & Ezequiel Di Paolo - 2007 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 6 (4):485-507.

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