Can Speech Act Philosophy Solve the Fact/Value Problem?

Dissertation, University of Oregon (1986)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

The topic of this dissertation is the fact/value problem, and the solutions offered by John Austin and John Searle. Crucial to the problem is a metaphysical picture which suggests that people somehow add value to the facts, and that the facts are value-free apart from those people. The fact/value problem arises from this picture when we try to explain or justify the particular value that someone adds to a fact. We are inclined to appeal to the fact itself, but merely mentioning the fact doesn't explain why someone found it significant. We need an explanation concerning the source of value, the person. What is it about people that leads them to value the facts the way that they do? ;I begin by briefly discussing how we can get the above metaphysical picture and the fact/value problem. Some of the early ideas of Ludwig Wittgenstein are presented in order to get a clear view of the metaphysical matters. Next, I discuss Wittgenstein's focus on the use of language and human action in his later work. With this revised focus comes a rejection of the earlier metaphysical entities. This rejection of metaphysical entities continues in the ideas of R. M. Hare, a modern philosopher who endorses a "gap" between facts and values. Hare presents a theory of descriptive and evaluative language, instead of accounts of facts and value. Behind his theory of language, however, Hare has basically the same metaphysical picture and fact/value problem as Wittgenstein. ;Having explored the fact/value problem as it is found in the ideas of two important philosophers, I turn to the solution to the problem proposed by John Austin and John Searle. Taken together their work may be called "speech act philosophy." I conclude that Austin's work only provides the foundation for the solution which was later offered by Searle. I find Searle's solution inadequate, in part because he also has the metaphysical picture and the fact/value problem. The last section of the dissertation suggests how we may solve the problem by rejecting the metaphysical picture

Other Versions

No versions found

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 101,551

External links

  • This entry has no external links. Add one.
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Fact and Value.Craig Taylor - 2019 - In Nora Hämäläinen & Gillian Dooley (eds.), Reading Iris Murdoch’s Metaphysics as a Guide to Morals. Springer Verlag. pp. 67-78.
Mental Illness, Metaphysics, Facts and Values.Chris Megone - 2007 - Philosophical Papers 36 (3):399-426.
The Qua Problem in the Value Interaction Debate.Moonyoung Song - forthcoming - British Journal of Aesthetics.
The Value Problem of A Priori Knowledge.David Botting - 2020 - Acta Analytica 35 (2):229-252.
Sentence and Truth Value.Chai-Hsun Chuang - 2006 - Philosophy and Culture 33 (6):67-77.
The Fact/Value Entanglement as a Linguistic Illusion.Óscar L. González-Castán - 2008 - Poznan Studies in the Philosophy of the Sciences and the Humanities 95 (1):287-305.

Analytics

Added to PP
2015-02-06

Downloads
0

6 months
0

Historical graph of downloads

Sorry, there are not enough data points to plot this chart.
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Douglas Birsch
Shippensburg University

Citations of this work

No citations found.

Add more citations

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references