Trust among Strangers

Philosophy of Science 71 (3):286-319 (2004)
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Abstract

The paper presents a simulation of the dynamics of impersonal trust. It shows how a “trust and reciprocate” norm can emerge and stabilize in populations of conditional cooperators. The norm, or behavioral regularity, is not to be identified with a single strategy. It is instead supported by several conditional strategies that vary in the frequency and intensity of sanctions.

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Cristina Bicchieri
University of Pennsylvania

References found in this work

Rationality and Coordination.Margaret Gilbert & Cristina Bicchieri - 1996 - Philosophical Review 105 (1):105.
The Dynamics of Rational Deliberation.Brian Skyrm - 1994 - Behavior and Philosophy 22 (1):67-70.

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