Some considerations about the further development of situational analysis

Philosophy of the Social Sciences 28 (3):422-433 (1998)
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Abstract

Popper gives the concept of social situation the role of key term in the method ology of situational analysis. The important characteristics of the social situation are aims and knowledge, which are attributed to the actor and are part of the situation. Furthermore, the elements of the situation create or are, as social institutions, obstacles to the actor. But more complex situations exist which here are called actor specific situations and are much more structured by the actor. The aims and knowledge of the actors vary widely, so they cannot be attributed to the actors without a serious loss of information. The elements have social meanings and meanings which are ascribed to them by the actors. The concept of dual methodology tries to grasp these complex situations for the purpose of empirical research by combining causal explanation of analytical methodology with intentional explanation of a methodology of understanding. The interface between these methodologies is formed by the concept of generative mecha nisms. These are part of the causal theory as well as data gathered for the intentional explanation. The ideal result of research is achieved if the hypothesis cannot be rejected and the two kinds of generative mechanisms coincide. In this case, the hypothesis is a proven causal statement. Finally, the aptitude of the interpretative methodology for gathering the generative mechanisms is dis cussed.

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Citations of this work

Popper’s ontology of situated human action.Allen Oakley - 2002 - Philosophy of the Social Sciences 32 (4):455-486.

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References found in this work

The intentionality of intention and action.John R. Searle - 1979 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 22 (1-4):253 – 280.
The intentionality of intention and action.John R. Searle - 1980 - Cognitive Science 4 (1):47-70.
Popper's metaphysical research program for the human sciences.Noretta Koertge - 1975 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 18 (4):437 – 462.

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