Friendliness and sympathy in logic

In Jean-Yves Béziau (ed.), Logica Universalis: Towards a General Theory of Logic. Boston: Birkhäuser Verlog. pp. 191-206 (2005)
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Abstract

We define and examine a notion of logical friendliness, which is a broadening of the familiar notion of classical consequence. The concept is tudied first in its simplest form, and then in a syntax-independent version, which we call sympathy. We also draw attention to the surprising number of familiar notions and operations with which it makes contact, providing a new light in which they may be seen.

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