The Conflict of Rigidity and Precision in Designation

Logos and Episteme 11 (1):19-27 (2020)
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Abstract

My paper provides reasons in support of the view that vague identity claims originate from a conflict between rigidity and precision in designation. To put this stricly, let x be the referent of the referential terms P and Q. Then, that the proposition “that any x being both a P and a Q” is vague involves that the semantic intuitions at work in P and Q reveal a conflict between P and Q being simultaneously rigid and precise designators. After having shortly commented on an example of vague identity claim, I make the case for my proposal, by discussing how reference by baptism conflicts with descriptive attitudes towards understanding conceptual contents.

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Daniele Bertini
University Of Rome 2, Tor Vergata

Citations of this work

The Vagueness of Religious Beliefs.Daniele Bertini - 2020 - European Journal for Philosophy of Religion 12 (2):181-210.

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References found in this work

Can there be vague objects?Gareth Evans - 1978 - Analysis 38 (4):208.
Can there be vague objects?Gareth Evans - 2004 - In Tim Crane & Katalin Farkas (eds.), Metaphysics: a guide and anthology. New York: Oxford University Press.
Identity and vagueness.Richmond H. Thomason - 1982 - Philosophical Studies 42 (3):329 - 332.
How to Reason About Vague Objects.Peter van Inwagen - 1988 - Philosophical Topics 16 (1):255-284.

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