Negation on the Australian Plan

Journal of Philosophical Logic 48 (6):1119-1144 (2019)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

We present and defend the Australian Plan semantics for negation. This is a comprehensive account, suitable for a variety of different logics. It is based on two ideas. The first is that negation is an exclusion-expressing device: we utter negations to express incompatibilities. The second is that, because incompatibility is modal, negation is a modal operator as well. It can, then, be modelled as a quantifier over points in frames, restricted by accessibility relations representing compatibilities and incompatibilities between such points. We defuse a number of objections to this Plan, raised by supporters of the American Plan for negation, in which negation is handled via a many-valued semantics. We show that the Australian Plan has substantial advantages over the American Plan.

Other Versions

No versions found

Similar books and articles

Subminimal Negation on the Australian Plan.Selcuk Kaan Tabakci - 2022 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 51 (5):1119-1139.
Shrieking, Shrugging, and the Australian Plan.Hitoshi Omori & Michael De - 2022 - Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 63 (2).
Four-valued semantics for relevant logics (and some of their rivals).Greg Restall - 1995 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 24 (2):139 - 160.
There is More to Negation than Modality.Michael De & Hitoshi Omori - 2018 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 47 (2):281-299.
Another plan for negation.Nissim Francez - 2019 - Australasian Journal of Logic 16 (5):159-176.

Analytics

Added to PP
2018-09-18

Downloads
1,307 (#14,593)

6 months
165 (#26,985)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author Profiles

Franz Berto
University of St. Andrews
Greg Restall
University of Melbourne

Citations of this work

Truthmaker Semantics for Relevant Logic.Mark Jago - 2020 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 49 (4):681-702.
Update rules and semantic universals.Luca Incurvati & Giorgio Sbardolini - 2023 - Linguistics and Philosophy 46 (2):259-289.
What is a Relevant Connective?Shawn Standefer - 2022 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 51 (4):919-950.
Why Must Incompatibility Be Symmetric?Ryan Simonelli - 2024 - Philosophical Quarterly 74 (2):658-682.

View all 27 citations / Add more citations

References found in this work

Naming and Necessity.Saul Kripke - 1980 - Philosophy 56 (217):431-433.
Naming and Necessity.Saul Kripke - 1980 - Critica 17 (49):69-71.
A Theory of Conditionals.Robert Stalnaker - 1968 - In Nicholas Rescher, Studies in Logical Theory. Oxford,: Blackwell. pp. 98-112.
Counterfactuals.David Lewis - 1973 - Foundations of Language 13 (1):145-151.

View all 39 references / Add more references