I am not myself: Augustine, Locke, and Levinas on the Self

Levinas Studies 15:147-160 (2021)
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Abstract

The duality or separation of self and me is central to the thinking of Emmanuel Levinas, but it is difficult to understand, not least because of the powerful hold that John Locke’s account of personal identity still has on our thinking of the self. By drawing on Augustine and especially Jean-Luc Marion’s reading of Augustine in In the Self’s Place, it is possible to gain insight into Augustine’s not yet Lockean account of the self so as to arrive at Levinas’s no longer Lockean account.

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Robert Bernasconi
Pennsylvania State University

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