Abstract

This thesis discusses the traditional problem of Free Will. I refer to this problem as, equivalently, the Deterministic challenge or the Deterministic dilemma. It can be phrased, roughly, as follows: Determinism is either true or false. If Determinism is true, then all of our actions are determined by events which ultimately, are beyond our control. If Determinism is false, then all of our actions are mere random happenings. Thus, our actions can never be legitimately said to be our own. ;Attempts at answering this dilemma have come historically from two sources. Compatibilists accept the truth of Determinism, yet try to show how freedom of action can be reconciled with such a view. In chapter I, I discuss a purported Compatibilist solution offered by a Neo-Humean, Wilfrid Sellars. I try to show that his attempt fails, and for fundamental, rather than technical reasons. ;In chapter II, I discuss contemporary Libertarianism. This camp believes that people are free, but that this can be so only if Determinism is false. Thus their onus is to show that our actions are not mere accidents. The Libertarian apologist dicussed is Daniel Dennett, a worthier advocate of the position, it seems to me, than the more well-known Libertarians, Campbell and Popper. ;Chapter III discusses a unique answer to the Deterministic dilemma. Here I sympathetically review Wittgenstein's 'dissolutionism'. Since, to the best of my knowledge, this is virgin ground in the discussion of Free Will, my aim is not so much to assess Wittgenstein's success, but rather to plausibly interpret his position, pointing out the novel twists which his position includes. ;The significance of the Free Will problem has traditionally been applied to its ethical ramifications. It has been taken as an obvious, perhaps even a conceptual truth, that freedom, or being able to do otherwise, is a necessary condition for the justified ascription of moral responsibility. Chapter IV questions the truth of this assumption. The conclusion is that this assumption is unwarranted. ;Chapter V further attacks, heretofore almost universally accepted maxims. I attempt to show that the identity of freedom with being able to do otherwise is too simplistic, and ignores the normative aspect which we deem freedom to have. . . . UMI