Extending Cognition Through Superstition: A Niche-Construction Theory Approach

In Lorenzo Magnani & Claudia Casadio (eds.), Model Based Reasoning in Science and Technology. Logical, Epistemological, and Cognitive Issues. Cham, Switzerland: Springer International Publishing (2006)
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Abstract

Superstitious practices have been considered since the ancient times as signs of deviating cognitive forms, concerned with irrelevant causal relationships, and/or reducible to religious beliefs. Recent theories such as the extended mind and cognitive niche construction, though, can shed new light on superstition and its apparently unreasonable success. The trigger is to observe how most superstitions are not mere “beliefs” hosted in a naked mind, but rather involve a strong coupling between the mind and some external props allowing its extensions away from the skull: from bodily gestures, to artifacts and other agents. The mind’s capability to extend into the environment supports the related theory of cognitive niche construction, suggesting that human agents achieved better and better performances by creating external structures able to provide better and persistent scaffoldings for their cognitive performances. When it is not possible to detect and exploit the presence of a cognitive niche in the environment, superstitious practices can be identified as the possibility to deploy an emergency-cognitive niche projected by the superstitious agent into the world by means of a superstitious prop. It is poorer and less reliable but preferable to utter blank, and most important it is still coupled with the external world, thus maintaining the fundamental characteristic of cognitive niches, that is distribution.

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