An Intensional Formalization of Generic Statements

Logica Universalis 17 (2):139-160 (2023)
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Abstract

A statement is generic if it expresses a generalization about the members of a kind, as in, ’Pear trees blossom in May,’ or, ’Birds lay egg’. In classical logic, generic statements are formalized as universally quantified conditionals: ‘For all x, if..., then....’ We want to argue that such a logical interpretation fails to capture the intensional character of generic statements because it cannot express the generic statement as a simple proposition in Aristotle’s sense, i.e., a proposition containing only one single predicate. On the contrary, we want to show that typed lambda-abstraction can help us transform the classical, non-simple and extensional expression of generic statements into a new, simple and intensional formalization, through the introduction of an abductively defined operator ALL*. This new operator allows for the possibility of a single predication, e.g. fly(), because it builds, out of a concept like ‘bird’, a concrete universal, e.g. ‘birds’, upon which the single predicate can be applied to authentically formalize a generic statement, e.g. ‘birds fly’.

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References found in this work

1997.“On Sinn and Bedeutung.”.Gottlob Frege - 1997 - In Michael Beaney (ed.), Frege Reader. Cambridge: Wiley-Blackwell.
Combinatory Logic.Haskell B. Curry, J. Roger Hindley & Jonathan P. Seldin - 1977 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 42 (1):109-110.
Outlines of a Formalist Philosophy of Mathematics.Haskell B. Curry & Abraham Robinson - 1952 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 3 (10):197-200.

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