When my Own Beliefs are not First-Personal Enough

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Theoria 22 (1):35-41 (2009)
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Abstract

Richard Moran has defended the need for two modes of access to our mental contents, a first-personal and a third-personal one. In this paper we maintain that, in the moral case, an excess of concentration on the a third-personal perspective precludes accounting for our responsibility over our own beliefs and our capacity to normatively respond to the world.

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10.1387/theoria.480

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reprint Bensusan, Hilan; de Pinedo, Manuel (2007) "When my Own Beliefs are not First-Personal Enough". Theoria: Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia 22(1):35-41

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Author Profiles

Hilan Bensusan
University of Brasilia
Manuel De Pinedo García
University of Granada

Citations of this work

First‐Person Authority and Self‐Knowledge as an Achievement.Josep E. Corbí - 2010 - European Journal of Philosophy 18 (3):325-362.

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References found in this work

Philosophical Investigations.Ludwig Wittgenstein - 1953 - New York, NY, USA: Wiley-Blackwell. Edited by G. E. M. Anscombe.
Mind and World.Huw Price & John McDowell - 1994 - Philosophical Books 38 (3):169-181.
Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy.Bernard Williams - 1987 - Behaviorism 15 (2):179-181.

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