Peirce and the Unity of the Proposition

Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society 50 (2):201 (2014)
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Abstract

The problem of the unity of the proposition—what distinguishes a proposition from a mere list of constituents, so that the former is able to say something while the latter is not?—is as old as philosophy. It is evoked at the end of Plato’s Sophist, where the Stranger affirms that when one makes a statement “he does not merely give names, but he reaches a conclusion by combining verbs with nouns” ; and it is discussed by Aristotle in De Interpretatione, where it is said that since “falsity and truth have to do with combination and separation”, then “the first single statementmaking sentence is the affirmation, next is the negation” ; but “every statement-making..

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Francesco Bellucci
University of Bologna

Citations of this work

Anatomy of a proposition.Bjørn Jespersen - 2019 - Synthese 196 (4):1285-1324.
Christine Ladd-Franklin on the nature and unity of the proposition.Kenneth Boyd - 2021 - British Journal for the History of Philosophy 30 (2):231-249.
Peirce on facts and true propositions.Richard Kenneth Atkins - 2016 - British Journal for the History of Philosophy 24 (6):1176-1192.
Editorial Preface.Ahti-Veikko Pietarinen - 2015 - Synthese 192 (4):877-879.

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References found in this work

On Denoting.Bertrand Russell - 1905 - Mind 14 (56):479-493.
Peirce's Continuous Predicates.Francesco Bellucci - 2013 - Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society 49 (2):178.

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