The Declaratory Theory of Law

Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 33 (3):421-444 (2013)
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Abstract

This article examines the declaratory theory of law and defends it from the most prominent modern attack on it. It explains that the real declaratory theory is not the caricature of it criticized in modern writing and that, in fact, the theory properly understood is remarkably close to the position adopted by some of the theory’s most notable opponents. The article further examines the common law’s continuing commitment to the declaratory theory, a commitment that remains strong despite the considerable hostility of the academy. It explains that this commitment reflects the nature of the common law

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Citations of this work

Why Legal Formalism Is Not a Stupid Thing.Paul Troop - 2018 - Ratio Juris 31 (4):428-443.

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