Unsettled Thoughts: A Theory of Degrees of Rationality [Book Review]

Philosophical Review 131 (3):394-398 (2022)
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2022-11-06

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Bob Beddor
University of Florida

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References found in this work

On the relationship between propositional and doxastic justification.John Turri - 2010 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 80 (2):312-326.
Belief is weak.John Hawthorne, Daniel Rothschild & Levi Spectre - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (5):1393-1404.
New Work For Certainty.Bob Beddor - 2020 - Philosophers' Imprint 20 (8).
How I learned to stop worrying and love probability 1.Daniel Greco - 2015 - Philosophical Perspectives 29 (1):179-201.
Belief Is Credence One (in Context).Roger Clarke - 2013 - Philosophers' Imprint 13:1-18.

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