Hume’s Reason [Book Review]

Philosophical Review 112 (4):572-575 (2003)
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Abstract

Hume is widely regarded as an antirationalist and skeptic about reason. Yet he often appeals to reason. He also treats “understanding” and “reason” as virtually synonymous and ascribes seemingly cognitive functions to the imagination and the passions—functions that he elsewhere attributes to reason. What, then, is reason and how is it connected to reasoning in Hume's philosophy?

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00318108

DOI

10.1215/00318108-112-4-572

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Tom Beauchamp
Georgetown University

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