Necessarily Incompatible Consistent Wants

Acta Analytica 32 (4):489-490 (2017)
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Abstract

This paper argues that the wants or desires of a person can be consistent with each other and still necessarily incompatible with each other and for interesting reasons. It is argued here that this problem is not rare and that there is no solution in sight.

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10.1007/s12136-017-0319-2

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Peter Baumann
Swarthmore College

Citations of this work

Consistent desires and climate change.Daniel Coren - 2024 - Analytic Philosophy 65 (2):241-255.

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