Abstract

One branch of virtue epistemology, Virtue-Responsibilism, has argued that the intellectual virtues are analogous in structure to Aristotelian moral virtues. Like Aristotelian moral virtues, intellectual virtues are acquired dispositions of motivation, emotion, action, and perception. Responsibilists argue that intellectual virtues, e.g., open-mindedness, intellectual courage, and intellectual autonomy, are praiseworthy character traits, over which we have some control and for which we are responsible. If Responsibilism is correct, is there a distinction between moral virtues and intellectual virtues? I address two different arguments for the claim that there is a distinction, in the sense that the intellectual virtues are a special subset of the moral virtues. Both Linda Zagzebski and Jason Baehr have argued that the criteria for intellectual virtue include all of the criteria for moral virtue, but also include additional criteria that set the intellectual virtues apart from other moral virtues. I contend that Zagzebski’s and Baehr’s arguments fail. Ultimately, we won’t be able to determine whether Responsibilist intellectual virtues are distinct from moral virtues until we decide on the scope of ‘the moral’ and ‘moral virtue’.