Access denied: epistemic obstruction and the distribution of knowledge

Synthese 201 (1):1-20 (2022)
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2023

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10.1007/s11229-022-04007-z

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Heather Battaly
University of Connecticut

Citations of this work

Reply to Dalmiya.Casey Rebecca Johnson - 2024 - Journal of Philosophical Research 49:193-203.

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References found in this work

Trust as an affective attitude.Karen Jones - 1996 - Ethics 107 (1):4-25.
Nudge, Nudge, Wink, Wink: Nudging is Giving Reasons.Neil Levy - 2019 - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 6.
Asserting.Robert Brandom - 1983 - Noûs 17 (4):637-650.

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