Alcances E limites da psicologia evolutiva para a compreensão da mente

Philósophos - Revista de Filosofia 15 (2):29-55 (2010)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

Our intent with this article, given its space limitations, is converging two contemporary models of mind domain. Both are fundamental heuristic tools, being the first, the modular theory of mind, which enables us to understand important aspects of human cognition such as language, memory, learning (cognitive sciences). The second, the ornamental mind theory, explains certain apparent wasteful behaviors. The fundamental presuppositions of both metaphors are distinct: whilst the modular model is a product of cognitive sciences, the ornamental model is the yield of the sexual selection principle. Basically, as heuristic tools, the modular theory demonstrates the mind as a computation, as a product of selection (natural selection) which processes information; on its turn, the ornamental mind theory proposes an awkward idea, which Amotz Zahavi called the handicap principle (sexual selection)

Other Versions

No versions found

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 101,854

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Remarks on the modularity of mind.Benny Shanon - 1988 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 39 (September):331-52.
Is the mind really modular?Jesse J. Prinz - 2006 - In Robert Stainton (ed.), Contemporary Debates in Cognitive Science. Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell. pp. 22--36.
Massive Modularity: An Ontological Hypothesis or an Adaptationist Discovery Heuristic?David Villena - 2023 - International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 36 (4):317-334.
Modular architectures and informational encapsulation: A dilemma.Dustin Stokes & Vincent Bergeron - 2015 - European Journal for Philosophy of Science 5 (3):315-38.

Analytics

Added to PP
2013-12-01

Downloads
17 (#1,161,857)

6 months
5 (#1,071,419)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Citations of this work

No citations found.

Add more citations

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references