Truth and Probability in Evolutionary Games

Abstract

This paper concerns two composite Lewis-Skyrms signaling games. Each consists in a base game that evolves a language descriptive of nature and a metagame that coevolves a language descriptive of the base game and its evolving language. The first composite game shows how a pragmatic notion of truth might coevolve with a simple descriptive language. The second shows how a pragmatic notion of probability might similarly coevolve. Each of these pragmatic notions is characterized by the particular game and role that it comes to play in the game.

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Jeffrey Barrett
University of California, Irvine

Citations of this work

Using Logic to Evolve More Logic: Composing Logical Operators via Self-Assembly.Travis LaCroix - 2022 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 73 (2):407-437.
Evolutionary Explanations of Simple Communication: Signalling Games and Their Models.Travis LaCroix - 2020 - Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 51 (1):19-43.

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