Abstract

This thesis describes how we are best able to understand the experiences of other people. I present and defend a new theory of mental state attribution, a theory named emotional simulation. Emotional simulation identifies the process by which we gain reliable knowledge of the disparate mental states of other people. ;Many philosophical and social scientific studies of human interaction naively assume that we can know the mental states of others. A solution to the philosophical problem of other minds is required to properly interpret and evaluate ethical and political theories, theories of negotiation and decision-making. The problem of other minds is one of ascertaining that particular bodies are animated by minds, of reliably determining the content of specific thoughts and feelings. There are three main formulations of the problem: sceptical, normative and descriptive. I argue that analogy is the best general solution to all three formulations. Emotional simulation is constructed as a psychologically realistic theory of mental state ascription and an analogical solution to the problem of other minds. ;I show how the process of emotional simulation is powerful enough to yield knowledge which is both novel and reliable. The simple form of analogy is a:b::c:d. If it is a good one, the application of a:b to c generates an image which imparts new information about d. This occurs when the source and target analogs are made to be structurally parallel. A system mapping locates systematic and isomorphic correspondences between the analogs a:b and c:d, in spite of surface disparity. The more complex the mapping, the more reliable the representation of foreign mental states. Novel and reliable knowledge of other minds is read in a highly constrained emotional image of d. ;My theory of emotional simulation is constructed by modifying simulation models of mental state ascription to incorporate undistorted theories of analogy and emotional imagery. My formulation of emotional imagery corrects the existing simulation alternative to mental state ascription, and makes mental simulation more powerful. The mechanism of emotional simulation guarantees that simulated states are those states worth knowing; those states which are simulated are core states of mind. On epistemological grounds, emotional simulation is the most effective and efficient way to read other minds