Multiteam Semantics for Interventionist Counterfactuals: Probabilities and Causation

Journal of Philosophical Logic 53 (6):1537-1577 (2024)
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Abstract

In (Barbero and Sandu 2020 Journal of Philosophical Logic, 50, 471-521), we showed that languages encompassing interventionist counterfactuals and causal notions based on them (as e.g. in Pearl’s and Woodward’s manipulationist approaches to causation) as well as information-theoretic notions (such as learning and dependence) can be interpreted in a semantic framework which combines the traditions of structural equation modeling and of team semantics. We now present a further extension of this framework (causal multiteams) which allows us to talk about probabilistic causal statements. We analyze the expressivity resources of two causal-probabilistic languages, one finitary and one infinitary. We show that many causal-probabilistic notions from the literature on causal inference can already be expressed in the finitary language, and we prove a normal form theorem that throws a new light on Pearl’s “ladder of causation”. In addition, we provide an exact semantic characterization of the infinitary language, which shows that this language captures precisely those causal-probabilistic statements that do not commit us to any specific interpretation of probability; and we prove that no usual, countable language is apt for this task.

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2024-10-02

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Gabriel Sandu
University of Helsinki

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References found in this work

Causality: Models, Reasoning and Inference.Judea Pearl - 2000 - Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 64 (1):201-202.
Interventionist counterfactuals.Rachael Briggs - 2012 - Philosophical Studies 160 (1):139-166.
Independence, invariance and the causal Markov condition.Daniel M. Hausman & James Woodward - 1999 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 50 (4):521-583.
Compositional semantics for a language of imperfect information.W. Hodges - 1997 - Logic Journal of the IGPL 5 (4):539-563.

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