From the Qur`an to Freedom, from Naught to Civilization

Kader 18 (1):252-283 (2020)
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Abstract

The Qur’an, a divine book, is a source whose authority is indisputable in terms of being a source of knowledge for Muslims and setting the framework of “speaking” about God and also allowing for the determination of what is moral. The Qur’an’s authority derives from both God Himself and the intra-textual consistency. Reasonal and philosophical justification of such values as freedom, creation, reason, wisdom, endeavor, reliability, and particularly unity of God have been dwelled upon in the present article. At the same time, the visible effects of the aforementioned concepts, which are of great significance in themselves, in the external world, have been examined with their notional immanence and with the exemplarity of the Prophet. It is emphasized that absolute determinism, moral nihilism, and other materialistic views that accept the eternal existence of matter with the Creator lead to a worldview that suspends the freedom of choice and, in particular, the freedom of choosing a religion for humans. As Mu‘tazilah rightly argued in this regard, the essential condition of attaching value to an occurrence is that it must take place in an environment of freedom. The present article signalizes the way to achieve the theory, which we have named as Kalam’s Theory of Freedom, by drawing attention to the existence of some values that can also be reached through sole reason and rationalism intrinsic to the kalam discipline. Ultimately, it illuminates the path where the multicultural world can be a home for all of us without coercion and discrimination. Actions expected to attain their purposes and rationalism considering the possible outcomes of actions, especially pluralist and libertarian education processes, do not allow for ‘a single-valued world’ and nihilism. Qur’an’s warning about chaos is explicit for societies losing their religious, rational, and moral values.

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