A strike against a striking principle

Philosophical Studies 177 (6):1501-1514 (2020)
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Abstract

Several authors believe that there are certain facts that are striking and cry out for explanation—for instance, a coin that is tossed many times and lands in the alternating sequence HTHTHTHTHTHT…. According to this view, we have prima facie reason to believe that such facts are not the result of chance. I call this view the striking principle. Based on this principle, some have argued for far-reaching conclusions, such as that our universe was created by intelligent design, that there are many universes other than the one we inhabit, and that there are no mathematical or normative facts. Appealing as the view may initially seem, I argue that we lack sufficient reason to accept it.

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Author's Profile

Dan Baras
Bar-Ilan University, Ramat Gan

Citations of this work

Calling for Explanation.Dan Baras - 2022 - New York, NY: Oxford University Press.
Calling for explanation: the case of the thermodynamic past state.Dan Baras & Orly Shenker - 2020 - European Journal for Philosophy of Science 10 (3):1-20.
Neutrality and Force in Field's Epistemological Objection to Platonism.Ylwa Sjölin Wirling - 2024 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 67 (9):3461-3480.

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