The logic of justified belief, explicit knowledge, and conclusive evidence

Annals of Pure and Applied Logic 165 (1):49-81 (2014)
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Abstract

We present a complete, decidable logic for reasoning about a notion of completely trustworthy evidence and its relations to justifiable belief and knowledge, as well as to their explicit justifications. This logic makes use of a number of evidence-related notions such as availability, admissibility, and “goodness” of a piece of evidence, and is based on an innovative modification of the Fitting semantics for Artemovʼs Justification Logic designed to preempt Gettier-type counterexamples. We combine this with ideas from belief revision and awareness logics to provide an account for explicitly justified knowledge based on conclusive evidence that addresses the problem of omniscience

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Author Profiles

Sonja Smets
University of Amsterdam
Alexandru Baltag
University of Amsterdam

Citations of this work

Generalized Update Semantics.Simon Goldstein - 2019 - Mind 128 (511):795-835.
Substructural epistemic logics.Igor Sedlár - 2015 - Journal of Applied Non-Classical Logics 25 (3):256-285.
Knowledge, justification, and adequate reasons.Paul Égré, Paul Marty & Bryan Renne - 2021 - Review of Symbolic Logic 14 (3):687-727.
A new framework for justification logic.Alessandro Giordani - 2015 - Journal of Applied Non-Classical Logics 25 (4):308-323.
Beliefs supported by binary arguments.Chenwei Shi, Sonja Smets & Fernando R. Velázquez-Quesada - 2018 - Journal of Applied Non-Classical Logics 28 (2-3):165-188.

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A Theory of Conditionals.Robert Stalnaker - 1968 - In Nicholas Rescher (ed.), Studies in Logical Theory. Oxford,: Blackwell. pp. 98-112.
Two modellings for theory change.Adam Grove - 1988 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 17 (2):157-170.
Knowledge: Undefeated justified true belief.Keith Lehrer & Thomas Paxson - 1969 - Journal of Philosophy 66 (8):225-237.
Wang's paradox.Michael Dummett - 1975 - Synthese 30 (3-4):201--32.

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