How to Make Presentism Consistent with Special Relativity

Abstract

This paper argues that contrary to what is commonly claimed, presentism is perfectly consistent with the special theory of relativity. More precisely, this paper provides a formulation of a novel relativistic version of presentism that preserves the core “metaphysical stance” of classical presentism, and is fully compatible with special relativity. Others have tried to relativize presentism, but the view put forward here is different from the views that have been proposed in the past.

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2021-11-12

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Mark Balaguer
California State University, Los Angeles

Citations of this work

Temporal Ersatzism and Relativity.Nina Emery - 2021 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 99 (3):490-503.

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