Abstract

There are two interesting concepts in the theory of reason: deliberation and valueexperience. A cognitivist theory stresses the objectivity of values and claims that there are real values in the world which can be represented in practical propositions. On the other hand, the subjectivist denies the realitydependency of values and focuses on forms of practical reasoning. Furthermore there is a strong tradition in philosophy of dividing the explanation of action into two: conative and cognitive contents. I shall argue for a moderate Aristotelian conception, claiming an intersubjective constitution of values which could be perceived through emotional content. Emotions are a third, irreducible category in explaining human behaviour. But there is one important feature about emotions: they could have a cultivated status or not. If they are cultivated, we should speak of qualitative thoughts or practical habits. There are three claims I would like to defend: A Frankfurtstyle conception of deliberation and freedom of will cannot explain the normativity of practical reasons. We need a critical and valuesensitive notion of emotional reason. We explain valuesensibility by regarding some emotions as valueperceivers. This in turn has something to do with our social and moral education, what Aristotle called hexis. We learn about the importance of the intersubjective forming of our emotions as habits from Aristotle. But, there must also be a kind of noninstrumental form of free practical reasoning that enables us to constitute personal importance. Emotional logos is the ability on the basis of our emotional valueexperience to get clear about things that really matter for us contextindependently and contextdependently; and to get the right answer what to do and how to do this in a specific situation by also considering dynamic personal values. No doubt, forming this practical sense is a lifelong task.