Against willing servitude: Autonomy in the ethics of advanced artificial intelligence

Philosophical Quarterly (forthcoming)
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Abstract

Some people believe that advanced artificial intelligence systems (AIs) might, in the future, come to have moral status. Further, humans might be tempted to design such AIs that they serve us, carrying out tasks that make our lives better. This raises the question of whether designing AIs with moral status to be willing servants would problematically violate their autonomy. In this paper, I argue that it would in fact do so.

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Adam Bales
University of Oxford

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References found in this work

Why We Should Reject S.Derek Parfit - 1984 - In Reasons and Persons. Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.
Consciousness Makes Things Matter.Andrew Y. Lee - forthcoming - Philosophers' Imprint.
Moral saints.Susan Wolf - 1982 - Journal of Philosophy 79 (8):419-439.
AI wellbeing.Simon Goldstein & Cameron Domenico Kirk-Giannini - 2025 - Asian Journal of Philosophy 4 (1):1-22.

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