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An Interpretation and Assessment of First-person Authority in the Writings of Philosopher Donald Davidson
(2003)
Abstract
In An Interpretation and Assessment of First-Person Authority in the Writings of Philosopher Donald Davidson, first-person authority is the thesis that subjects have a non-evidence-based form of epistemic warrant for self-ascriptions of psychological concepts that does not attach to a third-person evidence-based ascriptions of the same concepts.Author's Profile
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Triangulation, Interpretation, and First-Person Authority: An Essay on the Philosophy of Donald Davidson.Eivind Balsvik - 2002 - Dissertation, University of Miami
Davidson, first-person authority, and the evidence for semantics.Steven Gross - 2012 - In Gerhard Preyer (ed.), Donald Davidson on truth, meaning, and the mental. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Davidson, first-person authority, and the evidence for semantics.Steven Gross - 2012 - In Gerhard Preyer (ed.), Donald Davidson on truth, meaning, and the mental. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 228-48.
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First‐Person Authority.William Child - 2013 - In Ernie Lepore & Kurt Ludwig (eds.), Blackwell Companion to Donald Davidson. Blackwell. pp. 533–549.
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Davidson, first-person authority, and the evidence for semantics.Steven Gross - 2012 - In Gerhard Preyer (ed.), Donald Davidson on truth, meaning, and the mental. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 228-48.
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Citations of this work
Davidson on first person authority and knowledge of meaning.William Child - 2007 - Noûs 41 (2):157–177.
Interpretivism, First-Person Authority, and Confabulation.Eivind Balsvik - 2017 - Philosophy of the Social Sciences 47 (4-5):311-329.
Davidson, first-person authority, and direct self-knowledge.Benjamin Winokur - 2021 - Synthese 199 (5-6):13421-13440.
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