Abstract

This research revisits the conceptual foundations and definitions of ‘game’, distinguishing it from ‘sport’ and ‘play’ through an etymological and philosophical lens. Given the vast range of ‘game’ in everyday use and the enormous diversity of the activities called games, Wittgenstein argued that games cannot be defined at all but have only ‘Family Resemblances’. Philosophers such as Bernard Suits have rejected Wittgenstein’s claim that there is no commonality among all games. But in recent years, some researchers have questioned Suits’ failure to refute Wittgenstein’s claim that games are definable on the basis of Wittgenstein’s anti-essentialist stance. Our analysis incorporates the interplay of etymology, historical context and philosophical discourse, clarifies the incompleteness of Suits’s definition, and addresses Meier’s physical-skill-fixed logical difficulties regarding conceptual models of ‘game’. By proposing a nuanced Venn diagram illustrating the intersections and divergences among play, game, and sport, we offer a redefinition that integrates the intrinsic motivations and societal influences underlying these activities. This redefinition emphasizes the voluntary goal-oriented, rule-constrained and non-utility nature of games while acknowledging the complex relationships between play, games, and sports within a broader socio-historical framework.