More Aboutness in Imagination

Journal of Philosophical Logic 50 (3):523-547 (2020)
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Abstract

In Berto’s logic for aboutness in imagination, the output content of an imaginative episode must be part of the initial content of the episode. This condition predicts expressions of perfectly legitimate imaginative episodes to be false. Thus, this condition is too strict. Relaxing the condition to correctly model these cases requires to consider a language with predicates and constants. The paper extends Berto’s semantics for aboutness in imagination to a semantics for such a language. The new semantics models contents of formulas along the lines of Hawke’s issue-based theory of topics, while remaining faithful to the validities discussed by Berto. Several relations between issues and topics are defined, which allow to overcome shortcomings of Hawke’s initial framework. These relations are then discussed with respect to their usefulness in the truth condition for the imagination operator.

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Christopher Badura
Universität Hamburg

Citations of this work

Context-indexed Counterfactuals.Mariusz Popieluch - 2022 - Studia Semiotyczne 35 (2):89-123.

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References found in this work

Aboutness.Stephen Yablo - 2014 - Oxford: Princeton University Press.
A Theory of Truthmaker Content I: Conjunction, Disjunction and Negation.Kit Fine - 2017 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 46 (6):625-674.
Aboutness in Imagination.Franz Berto - 2018 - Philosophical Studies 175 (8):1871-1886.

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