Abstract

The major assumption in my thesis is that truth is objective. This I characterize as the invariance of a claim's truth-value among people. The objectivity thesis is grounded in the correspondence 'theory' of truth, which in regard to the physical world is essentially the idea that truth is dependent upon the existence of mind-independent objects. Obviously ontological realism must incorporate this position. Various philosophers, including Putnam and Rorty, have suggested the idea of objects logically independent of experience leads to scepticism about the world. In Chapter One I seek to defend realism from this charge, and indicate that the realist can coherently claim knowledge of the physical world may be acquired by means of sensory experience. ;Chapter Two concerns whether there is any truth or falsity. Ramsey and Strawson offer variant 'no-truth' theories, which maintain phrases like 'is true' do not denote. Both arguments fail, although for different reasons. We have no reason to deny that 'is true' denotes a property. ;In Chapter Three I consider the issue of the truth-value bearer. In order that the objectivity thesis have significance, it must be possible for different people to grasp, assert, believe, etc. the same thing. That nothing can be true for one yet false for another simply because no two individuals can grasp or believe the same thing is a trivial, philosophically worthless position. I defend the view, held by Church, that statements of assertion and belief are incapable of adequate nominalistic analysis. Not only are sentence-tokens inadequate, but so are 'abstract' sentence-types. Propositions will have to number among the truth-value bearers as the objects of assertion and belief. ;In the final chapter, I consider certain pertinent issues regarding propositions, particularly Quine's objection that propositions lack adequate identity criteria. Here my basic position is that rigid adherence to Quine's demand results in there being no adequate individuation criteria for most things--including sentence types, which are his own candidates for truth-value bearers