Abstract

My dissertation develops and defends a theory of how experience justifies perceptual beliefs. First, I situate the opposition, the coherentists, in the contemporary debate, and I do this partly by reference to their readings of Kant. According to the coherentists, perceptual beliefs can be justified only by other beliefs. They consider Kant as a predecessor who, in one way or another, did not quite succeed in freeing himself from the notion that perceptual beliefs are justified by our experience of the world. I argue that Kant's refusal to "free" himself from this notion is legitimate, and that we ought to return to Kant's work to diagnose and overcome the excesses of coherentism. I try to make the Kantian view more convincing by bringing out a central problem with coherentism. Taking my bearings from Wittgenstein's later philosophy, I argue that the coherentist thesis is problematic, since it either leads to a troubling regress or fails to preserve the commonsense intuition that perceptual beliefs are justified by our experience of the world. I argue that the Kantian view can be saved from the most common coherentist criticisms, and that it is worth saving precisely because it avoids the regress while preserving the aforementioned intuition