Confirmation and justification. A commentary on Shogenji’s measure

Synthese 184 (1):49-61 (2012)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

So far no known measure of confirmation of a hypothesis by evidence has satisfied a minimal requirement concerning thresholds of acceptance. In contrast, Shogenji’s new measure of justification (Shogenji, Synthese, this number 2009) does the trick. As we show, it is ordinally equivalent to the most general measure which satisfies this requirement. We further demonstrate that this general measure resolves the problem of the irrelevant conjunction. Finally, we spell out some implications of the general measure for the Conjunction Effect; in particular we give an example in which the effect occurs in a larger domain, according to Shogenji justification, than Carnap’s measure of confirmation would have led one to expect

Other Versions

No versions found

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 101,394

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

On Ratio Measures of Confirmation: Critical Remarks on Zalabardo’s Argument for the Likelihood-Ratio Measure.Valeriano Iranzo & Ignacio Martínez de Lejarza - 2013 - Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 44 (1):193-200.
Bayesian Measures of Confirmation from Scoring Rules.Steven J. van Enk - 2014 - Philosophy of Science 81 (1):101-113.
Causation, Association, and Confirmation.Gregory Wheeler & Richard Scheines - 2011 - In Stephan Hartmann, Marcel Weber, Wenceslao Gonzalez, Dennis Dieks & Thomas Uebe (eds.), Explanation, Prediction, and Confirmation. Berlin: Springer. pp. 37--51.

Analytics

Added to PP
2009-11-25

Downloads
124 (#175,609)

6 months
7 (#710,381)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Citations of this work

Bayesian Philosophy of Science.Jan Sprenger & Stephan Hartmann - 2019 - Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press.
Fading Foundations: Probability and the Regress Problem.Jeanne Peijnenburg - 2017 - Cham, Switzerland: Springer. Edited by Jeanne Peijnenburg.
Foundations of a Probabilistic Theory of Causal Strength.Jan Sprenger - 2018 - Philosophical Review 127 (3):371-398.
State of the field: Measuring information and confirmation.Vincenzo Crupi & Katya Tentori - 2014 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 47 (C):81-90.
Skepticism and Epistemic Closure: Two Bayesian Accounts.Luca Moretti & Tomoji Shogenji - 2017 - International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 7 (1):1-25.

View all 13 citations / Add more citations

References found in this work

A Treatise on Probability.John Maynard Keynes - 1921 - London,: Macmillan & co..
A Treatise on Probability.J. M. Keynes - 1989 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 40 (2):219-222.
A treatise on probability.J. Keynes - 1924 - Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale 31 (1):11-12.

View all 7 references / Add more references