The Facts about Truthmaking: An Argument for Truthmaker Necessitarianism

Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 3:493-500 (2016)
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Abstract

Truthmaker necessitarianism is the view that an object is a truthmaker for a truth-bearer only if it is impossible for the object to exist and the truth-bearer be false. While this thesis is widely regarded as truthmaking "orthodoxy", it is rarely explicitly defended. In this paper I offer an argument in favor of necessitarianism that raises the question of what the truthmakers are for the truths about truthmaking. The supposed advantages of non-necessitarianism dissolve once we take these truths into account.

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Jamin Asay
Purdue University

Citations of this work

Deflating Deflationary Truthmaking.Jamin Asay & Sam Baron - 2019 - Philosophical Quarterly 70 (278):1-21.
Necessitation and the Changing Past.Arthur Schipper - 2022 - Theoria 88 (5):997-1013.

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References found in this work

Truth and truthmakers.D. M. Armstrong - 2004 - New York: Cambridge University Press.
Truth and ontology.Trenton Merricks - 2007 - New York: Oxford University Press.
Vagueness and contradiction.Roy A. Sorensen - 2001 - New York: Oxford University Press.
The least discerning and most promiscuous truthmaker.Jonathan Schaffer - 2010 - Philosophical Quarterly 60 (239):307 - 324.

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